Billion Dollar Tennis Baby

There are few tennis tournaments like the U.S. Open.  It is a big tennis carnival that draws more fans and contributes more to the New York City economy in it’s 2 weeks of activity than the Yankees or Mets in the same time period.  When you look at the ecosystem of the US Open in terms of revenue generated by the tournament, revenue generated by New York City businesses and other multipliers you have a billion dollar tennis extravaganza.  The US Open  is wholly owned by the United States Tennis Association (USTA) and 50% of that revenue, more than $100 million, shows up as bottom line profit for the USTA.  So how big is the US Open nut and how do you back into the numbers that make tennis’ leading extravaganza so extravagant?

Our number for the US Open total revenue plus economic multipliers is somewhere around $1.4 billion.  Here is our  quick breakdown of US Open revenue as provided by massaging numbers presented by the USTA and the city of New York as well as the “multiplier” effect the Open has on its sponsors and players.

 

 

Deep Diving on the USTA Revenue Number for the US Open.

For the past several years the USTA has reported revenue of more than $200 million from the US Open.  We backed into these numbers by using several of the USTAs own numbers, published sources of information and filled in numbers based on guesstimates when needed.  Here is our breakdown of the $210 million in revenue shown in the chart below.

US Open revenue is anchored by ticket sales to more than 720,000 fans at an average estimated cost of $120 for a total amount of $85 million.  With tickets sales alone, the USTA  almost breaks even on expenses for the event as the USTA states that it has more than 50% profitability from its annual revenue of $210 million.  Likewise, US Open sponsorships garner more than $60 million annually from heavyweight advertisers like IBM, JP Morgan Chase and American Express, all trying to reach the elite US Open tennis fan where attendees median income is $150,000 and the majority are women.

Another $60 million of revenue comes from television.  Tennis tv viewership has plummeted since their 1981 high when 8 million people or more than 4% of Americans watched John McEnroe vs. Bjorn Borg.  Nevertheless advertisers want to reach the high-earning, remaining 2 million people, less than 1% of Americans, who still watch tennis on network tv.  Tennis still earns roughly $24million from CBS for prime time and another $23 million from ESPN and the Tennis channel.  Additional incentives bump the gross up as well as web and other broadcast/rebroadcast rights.

To fill the gap we publish a miscellaneous licensing and sponsorship fees for the grounds as well as website advertising and other cross-promotional numbers which get us to the $210 million mark.   The USTA should feel free to publish the real numbers though we feel comfortable with the numbers below and think it is more important to be thematically and directionally correct than to have 100% accurate numbers i.e. these are estimates.

Category	USTA Revenue (Millions)
Ticket Sale	$   86
TV Network CBS	$   24
ESPN	$   23
Vendor Sales Licensing	$     7
TV Advertising (partial)	$     5
TV Cable Advertising (partial)	$     5
Tournament Sponsorship	$   60
Miscellaneous Suite Sponsorship	???
Total	$  210

The US Open Multiplier Effect.

The US Open is the principal money-maker for the New York based USTA providing  more than 80% of its revenue for the year.  Also, New York City, surrounding areas and localities where fans emanate from experience a significant bump to their business as part of a US Open multiplier effect.  Past estimates from a 15 year old study are that the US Open generates more than $420 million in revenue for New York.  More recent commentary says that the numbers have not changed radically, however in a day of $10 burgers and $5 round trip subway rides, the economic impact of the US Open is grossly underestimated.

We back into the numbers two ways.  First we try the high level approach of adjusting for inflation.  Using Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates as published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics we take the 2010 CPI  of 2.18 and divide it by the 1995 CPI of 1.52.  This creates a multiplier of 1.43 which we use against the $420 million figure.  When accounting for inflation, the real revenue multiplier to New York City and surrounding areas is close to $600 million in 2010 dollars.

Second, we use a method of estimating economic multipliers by category.  This approach is tricky business as Victor A. Matheson of Holy Cross University argues against the US Open’s multiplier saying they do not consider substitution, i.e. people who spend $100 at the US Open would spend the same amount at Jones Beach if it wasn’t happening that weekend.  Matheson argues there is no way  the US Open accounts for 3- 5% of all tourism dollars spent in New York City.

This article does not argue the US Open’s direct impact on the Tri-State economy as much as the combined direct and indirect impact.  So for example, is the US Open directly responsible for any and all Broadway sales or sight-seeing, cab usage or rental car bump in traffic over Labor day’s weekend and surrounding two weeks when most New Yorkers are out of town.  The answer is NO.  However, does the US Open influence families were the husband may want to go watch a match and his wife might want to do sight-seeing while the teenage kids go to see Spiderman on Broadway?  Or in other cases where a family may come in for one day of tennis and another day of sightseeing, etc?  CERTAINLY!

In addition, there is also the issue of re-purposed dollars which we address qualitatively.  For example if New York resident Jane Doe usually takes the subway on Saturdays to the farmer’s market in Manhattan but instead takes it to the US Open on Saturday of Labor Day weekend she is spending money she would have already spent on the subway, but in this case, it is being spent on the Open.

Also, we assume the average US Open tournament-goer is in the highest income bracket where spending $1,000 on a 2 day excursion to New York is not excessive.  The US Open has reported that its median attendee has income greater than $150,000 a year.

So where does the $600 million come from or go?  Here are our guesstimates based on an economic modeling approach rather than a bottom-up rollup of expenses that only New York City and other areas can provide.  Again, our estimates are on a total economic multiplier rather than just that for New York City and the surrounding tri-state area.  We do not consider global advertising impact from those who watch the US Open on television worldwide though that also bolsters the numbers.

Ticket Resales and On-Site Revenue:

US Open on-site revenue is similar to the movies as customers are expected to spend as much during the day on food, clothing and memorabilia as they do on tickets to enter.  Assuming total ticket revenue of $85 million from 720,000 customers we can see the same customers spending money on $10 hamburgers, multiple $5 beverages, $15 health food plates, $30-50 tennis sports wear, $25 US Open tournament brochures and other types of items and memorabilia.

Other web sites also discuss the availability of tickets that are resold on the US Open site, Stub Hub or other sites.  We estimate roughly 20% of all US Open tickets are resold at an increment on average equal to the original ticket price.  Forbes magazine reports that more than 100,000 US Open tickets sold in 2010 on the secondary i.e. scalped, market with average prices of tickets by round incrementing roughly $50 per round with the finals selling at a price of $350 per ticket.  These prices were quoted 2 weeks before the final which probably saw the price increase with a final between Rafael Nadal and Novak Djokovic.  In the past, showdowns between Sampras and Agassi have fetched more than $1,000 on the secondary market a day before the match.  Although our final estimate for resale is $17 million in total, if we calculated using an average resale using the Forbes estimate of $50 per round, the actual number is higher.

Accommodations and Transportation

The largest multiplier expense and the largest expense for the US Open is the Accommodations and Transportation multiplier.  Half of all attendees come from outside the tri-state area.  We expect attendees to spend the same amount on hotel and accommodations as they spend net on the tournament.  So if the average attendee spends $125 on a ticket and $125 on food and memorabilia, then we expect them to spend roughly $250 on accommodations per night.

Other significant expenses are the plane fare for 180,000, around $450 (remember for every penny-saver flight there is a high net worth flying a higher class travel) or driving expense.  Driving expense for the average US Open ticket-goer who drives 600 miles to the event is roughly $300 for 5 tanks of gas, plus food and beverage along the way, tolls and parking or somewhere around $450.  There is also transportation to and from the airport on average about $120 as taxi fares including tolls and tip exceed more than $50 from all locales and from Newark Airport can go as high as $80 one way.

Besides the New York City cost of airport transportation, we also include the cost of airport transportation to and from the 180,000 tourists local airports at about $100 as well when including overnight car parking or cab fare to the airport plus other expenditures including memorabilia, food and drink.  About 20% of all attendees park at the US Open at a cost of $20 plus more than $10 of tolls and roughly $10 of gasoline round trip.  Likewise many attendees rent cars who stay on NYC outskirts to get cheaper hotel accommodations or for concurrent business trips, another 2-day $100 expense.  (We don’t break that out from the general hotel fee).  About 80% of attendees take the subway or other public transportation to the US Open with some incremental cost.

Note:  we do not consider the impact of luxury US Open tours sponsored by the likes of American Express which include box seats and meet the player events, but that surely would raise the number.

Other New York Activities

We expect that half the people who travel to the US Open (180,000) spends on average an extra day enjoying NYC and its cultural activites.  We expect that person to spend roughly the same on their second day as they do at their day at the Open.  Whether seeing a Broadway show, average ticket price $100 and then having dinner, average price $50-75 with commensurate cab fares, taxes and tips, we have no problem estimating another $250 spent on day 2 of a trip to NYC.

Endorsements and Direct Sales

Beyond the normal multipliers that we consider of NYC expense and transportation expense we also consider direct sales channels for US Open tickets and special vendor considerations.  We estimate that 20% of all purchasers are USTA members who are primarily members to get access to early sales of US Open tickets.   At $75 for an average family membership the USTA may make as much as $10 million from memberships sold for US Open early access.  Likewise we estimate 20% of all purchasers are American Express users for the same reason.  With varying expense, we assume an average American Express card annual expense of $150.

Also, we look at player endorsements and other economics.  Maria Sharapova makes $25 million a year in endorsements.  Venus and Serena Williams, Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal make in excess of $10 million in endorsements.  Other players have multi-million dollar endorsement deals.  We add up all the estimated cumulative tennis endorsement money and divide it by the number of grand slams (4) and come up with an estimate of economic endorsement value to players of $50 million.  Many may disagree with this number and the reliance on grand slam credibility but even Anna Kournikova who had a $50 million endorsement agreement with Adidas won a grand slam championship in doubles with Martina Hingis.

Besides endorsement money, there are other economics in play.  Martina Navratilova and Rod Laver have recently been seen at the US Open signing autographs.  A Martina Navratilova autographed tennis ball sells on the secondary markets for $195, a Rod Laver tennis ball – $145.  Navratilova and Laver also have autobiographies they sell.  Vendors may generate $85 million in revenue, but they also pay some factor of that money in salary to their service and sales people who then spend it on other things.  Likewise for secondary sales agents, etc.

Intangible Economics

Lastly we have intangible economics of the US Open.  As we learned from hedge fund billionaire’s, Raj Rajnataram’s insider trading trial, the US Open is a magnet for business deal-making.   In one 3 day weekend, Raj took a vacation and made $30 million.  At the US Open, he met with Arun Sarin the former CEO of Vodafone to discuss Sarin’s launch of a Telecom hedge fund.  George Soros is known to be a player as is Bill Ackman, all hedge fund billionaires.  Many deals and meetings like this are done over the two weeks of the US Open and there is some unquantified economic impact which is of great value to New York City and probably only New York.

US Open Multiplier Effect
New York and Other Area	US Open Economic Multiplier (in Millions)
Estimated from Study ($420 million * CPI)	$   602
Vendor Sales	$     86
Ticket re-sale	$        17
Ticket Resales and On-Site Sales SubTotal	$   103
Hotel Rooms (1 day)	$    43
Hotel Rooms (2 day)	$    86
Airline	$    81
Car (transport and parking)	$    81
Airport Transportation (NYC)	$    25
Airport Transportation (non-NYC)	$    18
Parking (Parking + Tolls)	$      4
Transportation Taxi	$    17
Transportation (Subway / Bus)	$       2
Accomodations and Transportation	$ 359
Other New York Activities	$   54
Player Endorsements	$   50
American Express Memberships	$   23
USTA Memberships	$     11
Endorsements and Direct Sales	$   84
Deal-making	????
New York and Other Area Subtotal	$ 601

Sponsor Multiplier

The Sponsor Multiplier is the amount of revenue sponsors expect to make from advertising at the US Open or on television.  The total sponsorship dollars spent at the US Open exceeds $60 million.  Likewise, television revenue is roughly $60 million (and we expect television advertising rates to be far higher).  Minimally we expect the revenue generated by the sponsors and advertisers from the tourney is at least equal to the amount spent on sponsorship plus advertising.  So the net impact of advertising at the US Open would minimally have a net zero impact to the bottom line.  $120 million of sponsor and advertiser revenue gives an additional economic impact bringing the total economic value of the US Open to $920 million.

But the US Open’s core sponsors have long time relationships.   Relationships like these are developed due to profitability.  Since US Open sponsor products vary between high end and low end, we estimate the average profitability for US Open advertisers is 20%.  If sponsors are looking for a 1:1 return on their advertising dollar to bottom line profitability then we would expect the top line revenue would be 5 times profitability i.e. one fifth bottom line times five times revenue is 1:1.  So if sponsors and advertisers pay $120 million a year for the US Open, we expect their revenue generated to be $600 million driven by the tournament or a total US Open economic value of $1.4 billion.

A real world example benefits.  Let’s say all US Open ticket holders are American Express holders and spend $1,000 a year (or while on their trip to NYC) due to advertising and sponsorship at the US Open.  The Amex fees on the $1,000 is $30 and the annual fee for the Amex card is $150.  $180 out of $1,000 is about a 20% profit margin.  700,000 ticket holders spending $1,000 each on Amex due to US Open advertising is $700 million of economic value.

The reality, according to American Express financial statements, is that Amex’ corporate cardholders spend on average card a whopping $11,213 annually or almost $1,000 a month.  So the multiplier may be significantly greater.   Many of the US Open sponsors, like Amex, are headquartered in the NYC area as is the USTA.

Summary

The US Open is a powerful economic force for its stakeholders, the USTA, New York City and surrounding areas, sponsors and advertisers.   Though existing estimates hold the total US Open economic value at around $620 million for the USTA and the New York City tri-state area, when reviewed on a holistic basis and adjusted for inflation the total economic value of the US Open is closer to $1.4 billion when considering all locales and the breadth of advertising reach.

Probably the economics of Wimbledon and the other slams  are similar to the US Open in many ways which allows for the prize money they offer.

Closing Thought

Though the US Open provides substantial economic benefits to all involved it is an underperformer in the world of sports events.  If US tennis had the same crowds as in the 1980s or had maintained the same market share, the economic potential for the US Open would be 2-3 times the existing economic impact.  Next we discuss ways to improve the US Open and how the USTA’s stewardship of tennis succeeds and fails the sport.

Nadal Sticks a Fork in Federer’s Legend

Rises to Number 2 All Time – All Surface

After 15 days and 2 rain delays, Rafael Nadal has cemented his position as the greatest player of his era.  A traditional tennis champion, he emerged as a 19 year old wunderkind, dominating the clay court circuit going on to win the French Open 5 out of 6 years and accomplishing the longest clay court winning streak in men’s history.  With victories over Roger Federer on all 3 slam surfaces the last time they played and a 2 slam win streak over players not named Federer, Nadal entered the US Open finals awaiting the winner of the Roger Federer – Novak Djokovic semi-final.

Federer was the talk of the tournament and of the sumer circuit.  He hired Pete Sampras’ coach, Paul Annacone, and played with new abandon approaching the net at every chance.   For 4 sets and 9 games Federer executed the style Annacone had burnished in the forges of Pete Sampras’ instinctive game.  But then in the last 3 games, Federer changed styles, coming to net only once, reverting to his all-court / baseline style, ultimately losing the match.

The tennis world gasped and in a moment messages went out to the tennis player and coaching twitter world that roughly paraphrasing read like this: “Federer is not 100% committed to Annacone’s strategy”, “Federer can’t win tight or long matches anymore”.   Djokovic baked Federer for 3 hours, stuck a fork in him and said “He’s done”.

The number one ranked Nadal who had measured Federer like no other in the sport (14-7 head to head record) took his 80% finals winning record into the last match of the tournament and clocked Djokovic with devastating serves rivaling Federer’s speed while laying waste to Djokovic’s serve with 26 break point chances.   The fork was in Nadal’s hands this time.  Victorious, Nadal is the first person to win The French Open, Wimbledon and the US Open consecutively since Rod Laver and he has completed a career grand slam.

In his own humble style Nadal has gone about becoming the second greatest player of all time based on our championship quality ranking, SATERICCON.  The myopic tennis media and sponsor world focused primarily on Federer, humiliating Nadal with tennis vans painted with #2 ranked Federer’s image carrying him to matches and the exaggerated coverage of the Federer William Tell commercial.  Luke Jensen claimed Nadal had peaked years ago.  Tennis hasn’t treated Nadal as the number 1 player he was in 2008, coming back from an injury, but instead went right back to Federer as number 1 as if Nadal’s on-court ferocity were a hiccup in tennis history or as if Federer would have won the French Open and Wimbledon in 2009 had he faced Nadal at either tournament.

A man of Spanish lineage hasn’t been so disrespected by the tennis world since Jack Kramer paid Tony Trabert  $80,000 and Pancho Gonzalez $15,000 on the fledgling pro tour, despite Gonzalez’ year in, year out domination of the circuit and his 74-27 record vs. Trabert.  We have already discussed how Federer is the Larry Holmes of the tennis era with Sampras as it’s Muhammed Ali, on our blog.

Nadal has emerged onto the tennis  world like the Mike Tyson of the sport leaving devastation and ruin to all those who challenged him.  While Federer was the Gentleman Jim of the sport winning in an oh-so Swiss manner, Nadal has been all fire facing off against Federer with a boxer’s gait and bounce.   He is a man supremely confident in his athleticism, skills and mental fortitude.

So where does Nadal rank on the all time – all surface list?  Nadal has moved ahead of John McEnroe and Bjorn Borg within a handful of points behind Pete Sampras.  One more grand slam victory over a talented pool in Australia or any Grand Slam to come and he will pull ahead in Sampras on an all-court basis in terms of greatness (primarily due to his dominance over Federer).

And what of Federer?  Our model re-calculates greatness based on how other players you beat perform at future Slams.  Federer is now riding Nadal’s coattails in our rankings.  Federer moves ahead of Becker to 9^th on an all court basis and is within a point of surpassing Wilander based on his record at slams against Nadal.  On a fast court basis he moves within one point of Borg at 5^th place.  Any combination of Nadal winning a slam or Federer beating another slam winner in winning a slam will put Federer ahead of Borg but nowhere close to Stefan Edberg in 4^th place.

Cumulative All Surface Rank
via SATERICCON Analysis
1		Sampras
2		Nadal
3		Borg
4		McEnroe
5		Connors
9		Federer

What is the career trajectory of Nadal at this point?  As we mentioned before, Borg retired at 25 after winning his 6^th French Open and becoming convinced he could not beat McEnroe after 3 successive fast surface defeats at Slams.  Wilander didn’t win another slam after his tour de force over Lendl at the 1988 US Open.  We think Nadal will win one or two more slams but his period of dominance is likely to be over within the next two years.

The only two handers to consistently challenge for and win slams after 25 years of age were Connors and Agassi.  Neither were counter punchers or defensive players like Nadal has been for much of his career but instead they were aggressive baseliners, hugging the lines, looking to end points quickly.  To become more Agassi than Borg, Nadal needs to modify his game significantly (as he has done already) continuing to add punch to the serve, shortening points, being more opportunistic, and more importantly, shortening his strokes.  It is doubtful even with his weight training assisted body that he will continue to be able to defend,  get around his two handed backhand or have the massive rotation on his forehand as younger and more agile players come onto the court.

Slams at Age	23	24	25	post 25	Total Slams
Borg	2	2	0	0	11
Nadal	1	2	???	???	9
Connors	0	1	0	3	8
Agassi	0	1	1	5	8
Wilander	0	3	0	0	7

And what of Men’s tennis with it’s two major brands, Federer and Nadal sunsetting and not one teenager in the ATP top 100 ?  Will tennis wise up to its ways and go back to diversified surfaces as golf has different courses?  Will it correct the error it made by slowing down 100% of the tennis court when only 12.5% (the service box) may (or may not) have been in need of change?  What about the inflated record consequences of the 32 seed era which guarantees the higher your seed, the easier your path to a title?  No  one seems concerned about the convergence in results.  Records which occurred once every twenty years have now happened 3 times in 11 years with Agassi, Federer and Nadal recording career Grand Slams.  By sheer chance Agassi won the 2^nd least compelling career surface slam in the professional error.  Rule changes instituted by the ATP and other tennis authorities allowed Federer to win the weakest career slam . This is like 3 players hitting more than 65 home runs in 11 years, it just doesn’t happen without assistance (in this case administrative).  But in tennis, records are being broken with abandon, and there are 50 men over 25 years old in the top 100 who have no chance of ever winning a grand slam.  So what next new talent in the sport is a young fan to cheer?

Next, the economics of the US Open.

How Serena Williams Loses to Navratilova on Every Surface

Serena and Venus still a Rung Below Navratilova and Evert.

A Jon Wertheim article in Sports Illustrated followed up by other blog postings argue that Serena Williams was the greatest tennis player of all time.  Numerous tennis writers from tennis magazines , other periodicals and websites posed their own opinions throwing out numbers like TARP money for union jobs.  Though we think the story of women’s tennis since the advent of the Williams’ sisters is about Richard Williams Zen-like coaching methods, we weigh in with our opinion on Serena.  We approach the greatest woman’s player by using the same methodology as our evaluation of men’s all time great players, the SHOTS framework.

SHOTS is a simple and easy framework where we establish that there is no reason to hypothesize about who would win a match when there is actual data that shows who won those matches.  We look at winning percentage among all time greats, rank each grand slam tournament victory for toughness, provide a score and add them up.  We also normalize data throwing out bad data, only looking at players during their peak years, providing extra points for longevity.  Though Wertheim concludes that Williams would beat anyone on hard courts (her best surface), we look at every slam tournament on all surfaces and come up with a cumulative all-surface rating as well as a more granular rating per surface.

Our qualitative argument for Martina Navratilova vs. Serena is that there is nothing Serena could show Navratilova on a serve, volley or ground stroke basis that Navratilova had not seen before.  Wertheim argues that Serena’s first serve, which averaged 105 mph at the 2010 Wimbledon final, is something unlike anything seen in women’s tennis.  Yet Navratilova, the greatest mixed doubles player of all time, defeated big serve and volleyers Todd Woodbridge,  John Fitzgerald and Paul Annacone at fast surface grand slam mixed doubles championship.  (Special Note:  Paul Annacone was the serve and volley coach to Pete Sampras during his kamikaze run to 3 consecutive US Open finals in Sampras’ late 20s and early 30’s.  Annacone has now been hired by Roger Federer to provide a similar boost. )  And Navratilova looks like a pixie against those fellas too.  Likewise, Navratilova had an 85% winning record against master groundstroker, Evert, post 1980 on all fast surfaces.

Wertheim argues further that Serena has been thwarted in title matches by Venus, yet Venus and Serena have only played each other 23 times vs. 80 matches played between Navratilova and Evert.

Again, we don’t argue who would win one match between all time greats as it isn’t determinant but instead who would win more than 5 out of 10 matches between the players or who would win a tournament of all time greats.  With Navratilova we know we would get the fittest and fiercest competitor ever to play the game, hardened by losses to Tracy Austin at the US Open and her father’s suicide as a child.  She was able to beat then number 1 Graf, at the age of 35 to reach the US Open final before losing to Seles the next day.  In her late 40’s, within the last 7 years, she won two mixed doubles grand slams.  With Serena, we wouldn’t know who would show up, the great serving and fit player from the 2010 Wimbledon championships or the substantially overweight player from the Australian Open a year or so before.

Our own quality ratings of Navratilova’s cumulative wins against the field show at least a 2X advantage on every surface and at Wimbledon a 3X advantage vs. Serena.

SHOTS ANALYSIS

Martina Navratilova and her long time rival, Chris Evert, come out head and shoulders above the rest of women’s tennis via SHOTS analysis.  Serena Williams finishes in the top 6 using our SATERICCON metric.  Using SITDON analysis, Serena Williams finishes behind Martina Navratilova, and Steffi Graf, but ahead of Venus and Chris Evert though only playing 60% as many matches as Evert.

We give a special mention to pre-stabbing Monica Seles, who we consider one of the greatest champions of all time but was cut down in her prime by a crazed German fan.  Seles had won  8 out of 10 slams and her 9 out of 10 finals streak is unparalleled in women’s tennis where she had clearly ended the Steffi Graf era.   Seles missed 3 years of her prime tennis playing career where a continuance of her 80% winning approach could have resulted in 10 more slams.  Steffi Graf went on to win 11 more Grand Slams 7 of them while Seles was rehabilitating.   Graf never lost to Seles again upon her return despite being 2-3 against her in the years prior to Seles stabbing.

Women’s tennis lends itself well to SHOTS analysis as 84% of women’s open era grand slams have been won by 16 women, our Pantheonists.  We measure these top women’s play versus each other and hypothesize who would win a theoretical tourney based on real world match outcomes.  Slightly less than 3,000 matches have been played between grand slam titlists in the Open era.  More than 1,700 of these matches have been played between Pantheon players  and we looked at all of them.  The top 16 players are:

Steffi Graf	Justine Henin-Hardenne
Martina Navratilova	Evonne Goolagong
Chris Evert	Martina Hingis
Serena Williams	Arantxa Sanchez-Vicario
Margaret Court	Hana Mandlikova
Monica Seles	Maria Sharapova
Billy Jean King	Lindsay Davenport
Venus Williams	Jennifer Capriati

We normalize data only considering open era champions.  Though this does not give enough due to Margaret Court, we think the impact of prize money served to make the sport more competitive.  Though there is no “dream team” effect in women’s tennis as happened in men’s tennis .  (When admitted into  the grand slams in 1968 Rod Laver won a Grand Slam and an old Ken Rosewall challenged for Slams late into his 30s.)  We consider the lack of money prevented great female players from competing in the Australian Open and for a time in the French Open.   We also throw out Australian Open data for women’s play since it was regularly skipped on the circuit by top players such as Navratilova and Evert as well as Graf.

Our approach is supported by the fact that our metric, the Slam Triple, which has been accomplished 31 times in women’s open era was accomplished for the first time in Australia in 2001.  Instead, we substitute a Slam Yield Metric (SYM) for  the top 4 women which normalizes their data to consider how many slams they would have won if they had played every slam instead of taking breaks from slams as frequently has happened for everyone of the Pantheonists.    SYM is analagous to the NBA statistic for rebounds per 48 minutes played which looks at the rebounds of a player for the amount of time they play and then normalizes the data to a 48 minute framework.

SITDON Analysis and Serena Williams

Serena Williams finishes third using SITDON analysis.  Careful review of the Pantheon matches shows that it is hard for top players to beat each other consistently.  Serena’s 60% normalized winning percent is barely better than Hingis’ and Evert’s 57% and a bit better than Venus’ 55%.  Though Serena has a winning record over the overwhelming majority of Pantheon players she has played, she does not have an overwhelming advantage over her rivals as does every player before her.  Players like Navratilova who one year lost only 1 match and in a 3 year time frame lost only 6 matches clearly outperformed her vs. the field.  Evert who had clay winning streaks of 125 and 75 matches finishes far ahead of her in winning percent.

We have to leave it to conjecture as to what sort of winning percents Evert and Navratilova would have had if they did not have each other as rivals but it is possible they would have surpassed Graf even with Monica Seles sidelined.

Serena’s inability to get substantial winning percentages over Justine Henin who she lost to on Clay and Hard courts and her sister Venus on grass reduce her SITDON score.  Likewise an early rivalry with Martina Hingis was inconclusive on head to head matchups.

Interestingly, much of Steffi Graf’s winning percent for the SITDON analysis is generated by overwhelming winning records against Hana Mandlikova, Aranxta Sanchez-Vicario, Martina Hingis and Jennifer Capriati while she was only able to play the 13 year older Navratilova and Evert to a standstill breaking even against them in more than 30 matches long after their prime.   Both Evert and Navratilova would have had significantly better records (near 80%) in their era if one or the other had not played as they nearly split their matches with Navratilova winning 43 of their 80 matches played against each other, most in finals of tournaments.   Indeed, Evert and Navratilova, playing late into their 30’s played twice as many slam winners as Serena in their careers and had better winning percents even including play in their 30’s.

Yield Analysis and Serena Williams

Though the top 6 women’s players have won many Grand Slams they have frequently skipped slams.  Evert and Navratilova skipped the French Open 3 times each and the Australian Open several times in the period between their first slam title and their last slam title.  Steffi Graf, almost recognizing the lack of competition due to Seles absence skipped a whopping 11 slams, Serena has skipped 9 in the 11 years spanning her first and last slam victories.  We normalize the data by assuming that players would continue winning at the same rate they won their other slams.  From this we get a theoretical yield.

In the case of Graf, we calculate based on what would have happened if Seles had not been stabbed voiding her 11 slams but recalculating for a full 48 slams played.  Though Seles is clearly the second greatest clay court champion of all time based on just 3 years of data and had a 2-0 hard court record vs. Graf in Slams, we calculate Graf’s yield on a conservative 50% basis post Seles injury.  We post the results we think would happen below.

One number that stands out in the Yield Analysis is the stunning number of finals the all time great women reached while playing.  Each all time great player reached the finals of at least 69% of the slams they played with the exception of Serena who has only reached 46% of the Slams she has played.

Projected Grand Slam Yield Between First to Last Slam Titles
	Slam Chance Conversions	Slam Finals Reached	Slams Missed	Slams Played	Normalized Slam Yield Assuming Full Schedule
Monica Seles*	80.0%	90.00%	0
Steffi Graf*	59.46%	83.78%	11	37	24
Martina Navratilova	46.15%	69.23%	9	39	22
Chris Evert	45.00%	72.50%	8	40	21
Serena Williams	37.14%	45.71%	9	35	16
*  Only Consider Seles 10 Grand Slams after 1st win before stabbing
**  Normalize Graf’s slams for those missed and if Seles had not been stabbed

Serena Williams SATERICCON Analysis

Using SATERICCON analysis, we were able to rank each and every grand slam event won by a Pantheon player since 1968.   When we add up the scores we get the following rankings.

Much of Serena’s place in the rankings is based on the overall quality of the competition she played in the majors she won which is around the middle of the pack vs the other Pantheonists.  Both Venus and Billie Jean King won more difficult Wimbledons and US Opens.  Monica Seles won 3 of the top 5 most difficult French Opens.  Of the top 10 players, Serena has played the fewest Pantheonists, Navratilova playing almost 80 more such matches on a normalized basis.  Venus and Martina Hingis played more difficult slates as did Navratilova and Evert who faced each other 80 times.

Serena benefits from the passage of one of the greatest eras in women’s tennis which seemed to end around 2005-2007 with the retirements and semi-retirements of Hingis, Capriati, Davenport, Henin and Clijsters.  Serena has won 5 slams since 2007 and has benefitted from the sidelining of her competition.   By our measures, Venus and Serena have close to the same winning percentage and cumulative grand slam quality rankings.   Again our argument isn’t that Navratilova has a 2.6 times greater chance of winning a grand slam than Serena (though we think it is indicative of some sort of advantage) but that in a tournament 2.6 times more difficult than Serena’s average, she would be far more likely to win than Serena.

Measuring Eras with Slam Triples

In support of our thesis that Serena has benefitted from the retirement of one of the great generations of tennis, we look at the number of slam triples.  There were a few slam triples in the 1970’s and the 1980’s saw very few opportunities as Evert won 7 French Opens and Navratilova won 9 Wimbledons.  Evert and Navratilova won nearly 50% of the slams they played in the 12 years separating their first and last slam championships.  Even when they did not win they reached the finals roughly 70% of the time eliminating almost all chances for others to win slams in their era.

Slam triples increased dramatically as Evert and Navratilova’s retirement, Seles attack and later injuries to Graf opened the gateways for 8 different French Open Champions, 8 different Australian Open Champions and 8 different US Open Champions over an 11 year period.  No Slam Triple has been won in the last 3 years.  Though the Williams sisters win more than most, parity has been the rule of the post Graf era.  From 1975 to 1996 when Graf began to suffer injuries, only 7 women held the number 1 computer ranking.  Between 1997 and  2009, 13 women have held the ranking.  Serena has been number 1 less than half the time of Navratilova, Evert or Graf.

The most disturbing trend as exemplified by the slam triple chart is the shortened lifespan of the average top women’s tennis player.  Hingis, Henin and Clijsters seemed to have retired prematurely and Capriati, a child prodigy, was out of tennis more than in it during her prime.  Maria Sharapova and other attractive tennis players may be distracted by their sponsorships and seem to be playing in between commercial spots.

Richard Williams genius and why he has two daughters in the top 6 of all time players comes from his Phil Jackson-like coaching approach.  With his constant remarks that his daughters didn’t need the sport, by not burning them out on the children’s tennis tour or in tennis camps, and by deflecting criticism from them to him as the best coaches do, he has created a throw back group of players with longevity almost equal to Graf, Evert, Navratilova and the other all time greats.



Ranking Federer by Surface All Time

ADDING THEM UP – MEASURING TENNIS GREATNESS

We’ve covered how Roger Federer stacks up vs the other all time greats on an all surface basis.  Our methodology, SHOTS , argues that for tennis greatness it is important to establish a consistent framework.   SHOTS relies on 2 metrics we created, SITDON, which looks at career winning percent between all time greats, Pantheonists, vs. each other and SATERICCON, a multi-dimensional snapshot of the competitiveness of open era slams ranking each one of them.  When we aggregate the results of those slams for each winner, it gives us a portrait of the all time most competitive slam champions, those players who were greatest when greatness was required.   So rather than hypothesize, we look at player records, value the toughest tournaments and add them up.  In the absence of an alternative methodology, we provide a robust framework to answer the question, who really is the Greatest Tennis Champion.

Breaking out Federer’s match record by surface, he places 7^th at Wimbledon in SATERICCON score vs. Sampras who comes in first with a 2.63 ranking.   Sampras may not have a 2.63 times greater chance of winning a Wimbledon championship than Federer (though we think it is somewhat indicative).  But he is more likely to win such a championship where players have won 2.63 times more slams than in Federer’s era.  (Remember that we have adjusted the SATERICCON rating to almost double Federer’s chances of winning a slam vs all time greats based on cumulative rather than average score. )  Some consider Sampras’ victory in 1993 to be the greatest Wimbledon.  Quarterfinalists included 6 slam winners (Agassi, Edberg, Becker, Stich, Courier and Sampras) and 2 multi-slam finalists (Todd Martin and Cedric Pioline).  However, Becker’s 1989 victory had 4 quarterfinalists that had won as many grand slams as the 1993 quarterfinalists combined (Edberg, McEnroe, Lendl, Wilander). Both are great feats and show the confluence of great all time players and styles in that era.

Again, SATERICCON Analysis shows the quality of a player by the field they defeat.  Not surprisingly the 4 toughest Wimbledon’s occurred within a 6 year time frame, between 1988 and 1993.

A similar story plays out at the US Open where Federer places 6^th to John McEnroe’s 2.93  cumulative rating.  Though some have argued that Sampras’ first US Open victory was the hardest with 5 Pantheon quarterfinalists (McEnroe, Lendl, Agassi and Becker), on a SATERICCON basis, Edberg’s 1991 victory had at least the same difficulty and his 1992 victory was superior with 5 Pantheon quarterfinalists (Sampras, Agassi, Courier and Lendl) plus Michael Chang, a slam winner. McEnroe had a similarly challenging 1980 victory with 4 Pantheonists (Borg, Connors, Lendl) and multi-slam winner, Johan Kriek.

Again, SATERICCON Analysis shows the quality of a player by the field they defeat.  Not surprisingly the toughest US Open’s are concentrated in two eras when great new talents emerged to challenge the established talents still in their prime.   2 of the top 5 occurred when McEnroe and Lendl came to challenge Borg and Connors and the remaining 3 occurred when Agassi, Sampras, Courier and Chang came to challenge Becker, Edberg and Lendl.

When taken on a weighted average across fast surfaces Federer ranks a cumulative 7^th on the SATERICCON scale.   Though Borg never won the US Open his cumulative Wimbledon score puts him ahead of Federer.  Likewise, Becker and Edberg who won less than half the titles of Federer, rank ahead of him when you consider that they played at  the nexus of all time great play.

When reviewing the fast surface data, we do a reality check of Federer’s play vs. comparable players who emulated the champions listed above him.  With a 10 year age difference there is insufficient match experience between Federer and Sampras to make a judgement, though Sampras frequently won tournaments at least twice as difficult as Federer and served 5-10 mph on average faster.  Federer lost to Nadal on fast courts many times.  Would he do any better against a left handed serve and volleying McEnroe.  Using Federer’s record against Agassi prior to Agassi turning 33, would Federer do well against a left handed, tough returning player like Connors?  Finally, Patrick Rafter dominated Federer before he retired, would Federer do better against Stefan Edberg who stylistically is a similar yet vastly superior player to Rafter?

When we started this discussion of all time greatness, it was pre-Wimbledon before Rafael Nadal won his 2^nd title in 4 consecutive finals.  Nadal fits the prototypical model of the Pantheon players as a teenage winner of a slam or a person who wins a slam within a year or two of turning pro such as Connors in 1974.  All of the top 5 Pantheon  players established themselves this way but not Federer who finishes 10th all time / all surface via SATERRICON .  Nadal is likely to move to #2 all time with his next slam win based on his SATERRICON rating while still maintaining the highest winning percent among Pantheon players via SITDON analysis.

We now look at Nadal’s French Open record.  Nadal’s French Open record is marked by his victories over Federer in 3 finals and 1 semifinal and Federer’s participation in each quarterfinal during Nadal’s era.  Borg’s era is marked by the absence of great clay court players and the retirement of the great Aussie generation early on and Lendl’s is hindered by his quest for a Wimbledon title where he skipped multiple French Opens.   In Lendl’s absence, Wilander and Andres Gomez (who Lendl handily beat 4 times at the French Open) won the title.

Again, SATERICCON analysis shows the quality of the players by the fields they played against.  Not surprisingly the toughest French Open’s involve the Lendl – Wilander rivalry which saw many great multi-surface matches and by Jim Courier’s two year dominance of the surface over Agassi.

To improve his legacy, Federer  will need to do more as the path of his career continues to mirror Sampras with fewer victories and even less victories against other grand slam winners.  A US Open, Wimbledon or Australian Open win against Nadal (the French seems out of the question) and tournament wins over the next generation of greats will be significant and could improve his SATERICCON ratings so he passes Becker and Edberg.  Sampras, Borg, Nadal and McEnroe seem unobtainable and surpassing Connors will depend on his success against a younger generation of future slam winners perhaps including Juan Martin Del Potro (should he return successfully from wrist surgery) and maybe Sam Querrey as both Nadal and Djokovic are on the down side of their career grand slam trajectories and are unlikely to add significantly to their totals.  We don’t see a new generation of players on the horizon like Sampras and Agassi or Lendl and McEnroe that will catalyze the game via a great rivalry with Federer and Nadal.

SHOTS, the Hierarchy of Tennis Supremacy

There are around 1 million articles or comments on the internet about Sampras vs. Federer.  Few articles ask, in a tournament of all time greats on any surface, exactly who would Federer (the first seed by A32 rules) beat and how?  If you had to bet your last dime on who would win a tournament of all time greats, would it go towards Federer or someone else?  To understand this concept we created SHOTS, Secada’s Hierarchy Of Tennis Supremacy.  We discuss SHOTS at the midway point of this article while delving into more of Federer’s career statistics comparisons in the next few paragraphs.

Successor Champions

Successor champions occur in tennis when the prior number 1 player is on the decline or has retired and there is a succession fight for number 1.  Martina Hingis, became number 1 without beating Steffi Graf; Roy Emerson remained amateur as other Aussies turned pro.  Sampras is the only open era player to win a slam in his teens, 20’s and 30’s.  Federer never won a Sampras era slam.  He became number 1 after Sampras retired and as Agassi became too long in the tooth to compete with him as displayed in the  “rope a dope” 2005 US Open final.   With Sampras and Rafter’s retirement, tennis saw the same absence of high quality serve and volleyers experienced in the 1974 – 1980 era when the Australian greats retired.

Federer’s career winning percentage of 80.66% trails Borg, Lendl and Connors.  In the diluted A32 era, he won 16 slams, a career grand slam and reached more semifinals than others (as the A32 rules enabled).  Federer won the French Open when there was only a one time slam winner in the quarterfinals.   He lost his last 3 slam finals to Nadal on every surface.  But Federer’s career slam is exaggerated and, SATERICCON analysis shows, happened with weaker fields.  Connors was undefeated in slams  in 1974 dominating Borg on clay.  Would he have won the French Open, and completed a one year slam if he had not been banned from the tourney?

What happens when we adjust for all time greats i.e. Pantheonists who have won slams on all surfaces.  In that case both Connors and Nadal enter the discussion and Federer’s all surface slam Q-rating is last using our SATERICCON methodology.  Nadal’s supremacy over Federer is dispositive  since no other top Pantheon player has had a significant losing record on every surface against another during their period of dominance.  If Federer wasn’t his era’s best, how could he be the greatest ever?

Federer’s Career All Surface Slam Quality (Q) Rank
via SATTERICON Analysis
1		Connors
2		Nadal
3		Wilander
4		Agassi
5/Last		Federer

With SATERICCON on an all surface slam record we modify it to take only the best results on that surface during a slam victory.  Each player ranked ahead of Federer beat a field more than twice as competitive as Federer’s in their respective all surface slams.   On that basis, Connors wins over Borg on hard courts and clay to win the US Open and his grass win over McEnroe at Wimbledon are dispositive with Nadal ranking a slight second.

Nadal is a classic all time great emerging as a teen like McEnroe, Borg, Sampras, Becker, Wilander and Agassi and he won a grand slam early in his career.  Federer was unable to show an extra gear vs. Nadal on any surface, unlike a Boris Becker on grass vs. Edberg or Lendl on hard courts vs. Wilander.   We saw the limit of his game.

Federer’s 82% and declining, winning percent against non-slam winners matches Sampras’ first 874 matches at the same point in his career.   Federer’s record against non Pantheon slam winners was built on a gaudy 40-5 record against 1 time slam winners and baseliners (for the most part) such as Gaston Gaudio, Thomas Johansson, Juan Carlos Ferrero and Andy Roddick  (not a natural serve and volleyer).  Sampras’ record against the power serve and volleyers Krajicek and Stich was no better than 8-10.  Outside those players, Sampras overall record is superior to Federer’s.  With respect to matches between Pantheonists, Sampras ranks first for players with more than 35 of these matches, Federer last.

Creating a Framework for Tennis Greatness

So how do you control for rule changes and the many other variables in different eras of tennis when tennis corporatists inflate statistics and smooth the way to championships?  In a tournament of all time greats, who would win?  SHOTS is a 4 step pyramid where to get to the highest level of realization, you must first complete the prior levels.  Level one is experience as a Grand Slam winner.  Level 2 is experience as a top 16 Grand Slam winner (Pantheon level player).  Level 3 is won-lost percentage vs. other Pantheonists as reflected in SITDON analysis.  Level 4 is the difficulty of slam championships won using SATERICCON analysis or Slam Quality (Q) Rating.  So although one can argue that today’s players may be taller, stronger and use better equipment or that the fields have been diluted due to rule and surface changes, they can’t argue the number of slam winners at any one tournament or their head to head record.  It is known data.

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Our Hiearchy of Tennis Supremacy is dominated by SITDON – Normalized head to head record and SATERICCON – Normalized difficulty of winning a slam.

GOVERNING TENNIS PREDICTIVE MODELS

Tennis is governed by a few 80-20 rules of match play.  After 3-5 matches it becomes settled science as to who will win 80% of the time if one player shows dominance over the other, moreso in a slam with Pantheonists as seen in this year’s Wimbledon final between Nadal and Berdych.  The lone caveat is a “breakthrough” event when a player reaches another level of tennis such as Pete Sampras after his loss to Stefan Edberg at the 1992 US Open or Ivan Lendl after his French Open victory over John McEnroe.   They both went to a next level of greatness, dominating most opposition and fighting the remainder to a draw at worst.  In contrast, each time Federer lost to Nadal, he came back and lost worse the next year.  Watching Nadal’s career progression shows that Nadal has an extra gear that Federer doesn’t.

Absent match competitive data, style of play matters, certain players have a style that beat other players.  Kick serve and volleyer Rafter dominated Federer, similarly styled Edberg may have the same result.  Left handed Nadal dominated Federer at his prime, then left handed, kick serving McEnroe, a clutch player, may have a significant chance against Federer.   Or if Agassi who hits off the bounce early, dominated Federer, then Connors a similar lefty may have a chance against Federer and his backhand.

And finally, youth triumphs over experience when there is a significant age difference and mileage.   For example, Jimmy Connors overall career record vs. Pantheonists is less than 40%.  When isolating for when he was at his peak i.e. younger than 31 and eliminating players over 31, his normalized performance was 57% about the same as Borg.  And of course a young Federer beats a 35 year old Agassi.  Next, SITDON analysis of the Federer record – crunching the numbers.

Wimpledon and the Inflated Tennis Era

Fans at the 1980’s Wimbledon tennis finals between Stefan Edberg and Boris Becker would wonder what they’re watching if they entered a “hot tub time machine” and saw the 2010 semifinals.  2001 rule changes by tennis corporate rule makers diluted the value of a Slam victory and inflated the likely number of wins for any all time great.  Wimbledon court was slowed the same year to align better with the other surfaces all but removing the serve and volleyer from contention in the game.  Wimbledon has become “Wimp”ledon.

In 2000, tennis was faced with the loss of their “Greatest Open Era Generation”.  Boris Becker, Jim Courier, Michael Chang, Stefan Edberg, and the aging Sampras, Agassi and Gustavo Kuerten were all heading to the tennis court in the sky.  They were also the “Greatest Marque Generation” with championship level players from high net worth countries besides the U.S. including Germany, Sweden, France, a well-liked player of East Asian descent and a great South American champion.

Sponsors and Slams revolted as the brand dissipated.    Independently controlled Slams wanted to seed by surface and sponsors were concerned about the relative no-names or surface specialists  (read “unbranded players”) who could pull an upset in an early round and ruin attendance and tv viewership for later rounds.  Unable to bridge the discrepancy between relative talent on different surfaces corporate tennis decided to save the brand moving to the 32 seed (A32) approach which limited all the Grand Slams with the exception of Wimbledon from seeding by surface.  A32 reduced risk and the number of tough matches a top ranked player would play in succession saving them only for the later rounds.  Like McGwire and Sosa in baseball’s home run era, by inflating statistics, in this case the number of times the top players reached later rounds and finals, they could market the brand and hide underlying problems in the game while satisfying sponsors.  Like baseball, this resulted in smashing hard won tennis records and metrics as high seeds win more slams than ever due to A32.  Tennis corporatist’s stewardship of the game’s integrity is questionable with A32.  When considering their disastrous PEDs testing program after 25 years of scandal or inability to develop metrics to measure tennis athleticism across eras it is awful.

A32 business decisions impacted the game’s integrity with intended and unintended consequences that were many and immediate.   Besides minimizing surface specialist challenges, older champs in decline would typically fall into the 17-32 unseeded rankings slots but now had no “puncher’s” chance to knock off younger, high seeds in earlier rounds when they were well-rested.  This would then open up the draw for a deep run into a tournament and for new contenders to emerge.  Falling out of the top 32 for a tennis Pantheonist was equivalent to retirement as almost every all-time great has fallen out of the top 100 within a year of falling out of the top 32 rankings.

A concrete example of this was Federer’s US Open victory over a 35 year old Agassi in 2005 after Agassi had already played 3 consecutive 5 setters the prior 6 days, the finals played on one day’s rest.    It was a triumph of a player in his prime against one with an expired warranty and more than 1,000 pro matches under his belt.  Agassi’s prior match record to Federer before turning 33 was 3-0 including a shellacking at the US Open where Federer won 7 games.  Low-seeded Sampras faced a similar uphill battle in decline, losing to Hewitt in 2001 after performing a Slam Triple defeating the last 2 players to beat him at the Open, Rafter and Safin (the year before, he beat Hewitt).

Meanwhile Federer (82%) has an almost identical winning record against a weaker non-slam field to Sampras after 874 matches.  He has played about 55% as many slam winners as Sampras and played 30% the matches against tennis Pantheonists than Sampras and less than 20% the matches than Connors and Lendl.  Simply put, Federer won slams in an era with a dearth of challengers in a system favoring champions.

The “Slam Triple” is a metric we’ve created that marks when a player in a slam defeats 3 prior slam winners in a row, typically to reach the finals or win the tournament.  A32 has decimated this metric.  12 times on fast surfaces between 1973 and 2001 a player had to defeat 3 slam winners in a row to either win a slam or get to the finals.  Sampras did it 3 times.  It is another measure of the difficulty of a tennis tournament.  Post A32, no fast surface slam winner has beaten 3 slam winners consecutively to win or reach the finals of a slam.  Federer had a chance in 2009 but instead lost his 3^rd consecutive slam final on a 3rd surface to Nadal in Australia.

In addition, since A32, the top seed  has not won Roland Garros which speaks to the spurious use of seeding by ranking across surfaces.  When incorporating the slam triple for clay courts, we find multiple occurrences by Pantheon players as Ivan Lendl did it in 1984, Jim Courier did it twice to win his two French Opens in 1991 and 1992 and Rafael Nadal did it to win the 2007 Roland Garros.  Between the 1990 US Open and 1993 Wimbledon the slam triple was accomplished 7 times (in those 12 tournaments) by 5 different Pantheon players.  Clearly the most competitive era in tennis.  Thomas Muster and Yevgeny Kafelnikov won slam triples later in 1995 and 1997.

Wimbledon’s decision to slow down the surface and balls with A32 eliminated some of the power player’s advantage as seen by the contrast in the serve and volley slugfest of 2001 with dozens of net approaches by both players and 40 aces to the 2002 baseline tournament with 7 aces in total and few jaunts to the net.  Tennis commentators and former pro serve and volleyers:  Paul Annacone, John McEnroe and Darren Cahill, all commented on how balls no longer skid, they popped up while match after match saw multiple lengthy baseline rallies.

Commentators  blame racquet technology, but racquet technology doesn’t alter physics much when a ball skids 6 inches high.  The biggest change is most players are hitting down on the ball at a height equal to or over the net height which favors the groundstroker.  Indeed, no serve and volleyers made it to 2010’s quarterfinals.   Federer averaged net approaches on less than 15% of his total points in the tournament before elimination, averaging a measly 118 mph first serve for the tournament (well below some of Sampras 125 mph average service speed in many matches).

Wimbledon used to see the days of a hard charging Boris Becker, John McEnroe or Pat Cash coming to the net at all costs to avoid the balls skidding bounce.   Frequently the players would hit the ground before the ball, as grass tennis was a crazy form of hockey and rugby.  It wasn’t unusual for players to face off blasting volleys a few feet from each other.  You are lucky to see players get within a court length of each other in a match today and Nadal who frequently plays 10-20 feet behind the baseline remains the best all court player left in the draw.  Today’s tennis is like a basketball game where players only shoot 3 pointers.  What about using the rest of the court?  When this happened in the NBA threatening to ruin the game, they changed the rules.

Another consequence has been the advent of serving giants like Ivo Karlovic, John Isner, Tomas Berdych and Sam Querrey.  Though tennis has slowed the ball, the geometry of the game has made it easier for big men who can serve at greater angles and speed as the balls now pop up at stroke level for taller players rather than forcing them to bend to hit skidding balls.  In 2001 3 seeds were 6’4” or taller.  This year there were 10 such seeded players prior to Ivo Karlovic dropping out of the tournament.   Only Berdych, a baseliner made it to the semifinals.  Gone is the “serve and volleyer”, now we have the ”serve and rallyer”.

Other consequences are what to do as favorites begin downward progressions.  Federer is at the age where Sampras saw marked decline and has lost in successive slam quarterfinals.  Nadal at 24 is closing on the age where Borg retired (25) and is the same age when Wilander won his last slam.  Unless Nadal dramatically changes his game to reduce wear and tear and reliance on backcourt movement, it is likely that tennis will see substantial changing of the guard within the next 2 years.  And then what for the tennis brand as A32 starves its young talent of wide open draws?  Next, a framework for determining all time greats.

Unexpected Consequences of A32 Era
*		No First Seed Wins Roland Garros in 8 years.
*		Serve and Volleyers become Serve and Rallyers – Wimpledon
*		Slam Triple, Eradicated
*		Diminished New Branding Possibilities (What to do as Federer winds down and Nadal reaches 26, old age for 2 handers)
*		Super-Sized Players
*		Greater Difficulty for Older Champions to Win Tournaments

Secadametrics Introduction

Welcome, we’ve been blogging on the finance industry for more than 2 years on another blog.  This is more of a blog site to discuss social and cultural topics using mostly quantitative approaches and some times more qualitative.   Our background is in mathematics, statistics, computer science and finance.

First posts will cover tennis and Roger Federer’s relative record as we wrap up Wimbledon and move towards the US Open.